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INTRODUCTION: THE TRIANGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COOPERATION, POWER, AND 
NORMATIVE WELFARE 
Peter M Gerhartt 
The articles appearing in this symposium issue were developed for a 
conference held at our law school on March 26, 2004 entitled "The Future 
of International Intellectual Property: The International Relations of 
Intellectual Property Law." Together with papers delivered at the 
conference but published elsewhere, and some work not yet published, 1 the 
day was devoted to exploring the future of international intellectual 
property law by attempting to understand the forces that influence it and the 
methods by which we detennine the welfare effects of the system. The 
conference-a follow up to our earlier commitment to this field2-
consisted of scholars from two related, but distinct traditions--one group 
whose primary background has been in international relations theory and 
the others whose primary background has been in intellectual property 
theory. The intermixture was deliberate, reflecting a belief that each 
discipline must rely on insights from the other in order to complete our 
understanding of what might lie ahead. 
In this introduction, I propose to summarize the broad themes that I 
saw emerge from the conference, and to show how the papers presented in 
the conference relate to one another. Let me therefore proceed from a 
broad, thematic perspective to a narrower one, focusing first on what we 
tried to accomplish in the conference, then on what themes came out of the 
t Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
1 Because the conference was conceived to be a conversation among experienced and 
thoughtful experts, rather than simply a presentation of papers, participants were given an 
opportunity, but were not required, to publish a paper in this symposium issue. In addition 
to those whose papers are published here, the following scholars made presentations at the 
conference: Ruth Okediji, the William L. Prosser Professor of Law at the University of 
Minnesota, Kal Raustalia, Professor of Law at UCLA, Jerome H. Reichman, the Bunyan S. 
Womble Professor at Duke Law School (who presented the paper cited infra note 4), Pamela 
Samuelson, Professor at Boalt Hall School of Law & Information Management & Systems at 
the University of California (who presented her paper Intellectual Property Arbitrage: How 
Foreign Rules Can Affect Domestic Protections, 71 U. Cm. L. REv. 223 (2004), and Gregory 
C. Shaffer, Professor at the University of Wisconsin law school (who, in a work-in-progress 
entitled International Law as Power: A Taxonomy, presented an overview of the treatment of 
"power" under various approaches to international relations and related them to international 
intellectual property law). 
2 Peter M. Gerhart, Special Introduction. Reflections: Beyond Compliance Theory--TRIPS 
as a Substantive Issue, 32 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 357 (2000). 
1 
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conference, and fmally on a consideration of how the reader might 
understand the individual contributions in light of the overall themes that I 
identify. 
We initiated this symposium to marry two different analytical 
perspectives-the perspective of intellectual property and the perspective of 
international relations. Driven by the new technologies of communication 
and transportation and the concomitant increase in international diplomacy 
over knowledge goods,3 international intellectual property has entered a 
period of renewed and sustained vigor.4 The TRIPS agreement 
administered through the World Trade Organization (WTO/ requires all 
members (and those states that want to be members) to enact minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection and to set up procedures by 
which intellectual property owners can protect their rights. Along with 
renewed energy in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)-
the international organization that has traditionally dealt with transnational 
intellectual property issues-the current round of global and regional trade 
negotiations seek, paradoxically, both to relax6 and to enhance7 
3 Analysis of international intellectual property in a trade regime is increasingly seen as 
relating to the production and distribution of knowledge goods, reflecting that intellectual 
property law creates a legal package within which knowledge can be produced, hoarded, and 
transferred. See generally, KEITH MASKUS & J.H. REICHMAN (eds.), INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME (forthcoming 2004)(hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY) and PETER DRAHOS & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS 
THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? (2002). 
4 The literature on international intellectual property has grown substantially in the past 
ten years. Two perspectives appear to dominate the literature. The rights (or wealth based) 
perspective emphasizes intellectual property owners' legitimate claims to compensation for 
their contribution to society, the notion of theft or piracy of that property, and the importance 
of protecting intellectual property in order to facilitate international trade and investment. 
See e.g., ROBERT M. SHERWOOD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (1990). The 
knowledge based perspective sees intellectual property in instrumental terms, and 
emphasizes both the need for incentives for the generation of new knowledge and the 
limitations on those incentives for those who need access to that knowledge. See e.g., Keith 
E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the 
Privatization of Global Public Goods, 7 J. INT'L ECON L. 279 (2004), Report of the 
Commission of Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and 
Development Policy (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/ 
graphic/documents/final_report.htrn (last visited Sept. 19, 2004). The economic evidence is 
collected and analyzed in KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000). 
5 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 33 I.L.M. 81 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
6 The current round of WTO multilateral negotiations, the so-called Doha Round, is 
exploring ways of improving access to essential medicines within the context of the TRIPS 
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international standards. Simultaneously, the international relations field, 
freed from the grips of a bi-polar world dominated by major security 
competition, is searching for ways to use its considerable set of analytical 
tools, themselves reflecting the cohabitation of economics and political 
science, to understand how the transnational world works. Although the 
marriage between international relations and intellectual property was 
natural, and, indeed, inevitable, the couple is coping with the usual 
adjustments from any such union-how to meld analytical perspectives that 
are complimentary but distinct, how to deal with redundancy when the 
cultures overlap (that is, which copy of Moby Dick to keep), and how to 
deal with different language (you say tomato and I say tomato). The new 
culture generated by the amalgamation of these two perspectives is itself 
interesting to watch. 
I. The Substance/Process Dichotomy 
We get a good understanding of the relationship between the 
international relations perspective and the international intellectual property 
perspective if we examine each perspective along the familiar 
substance/process dichotomy. Recognizing that there is no way fully to 
separate the substantive or normative dimension of intellectual property 
from the procedural issue of how the law is made, we can understand the 
relation between the two perspectives if we understand the way that each 
perspective approaches the substance/process dichotomy, and then look to 
how the mixture of the two allows the two perspectives to work in tandem. 
By and large, the core concern of intellectual property scholars who 
study international intellectual property is normative. They want to know 
how we can permit the broadest possible access to existing knowledge 
without undercutting the incentives needed to generate a high rate of new 
knowledge. This substantive, normative focus on the appropriate balance 
between the incentive effects and the access effects of intellectual property 
framework. This is generally understood to constitute a TRIPS-minus- agenda, permitting 
developing countries to take advantage of the access flexibilities built into TRIPS, and, in 
some cases, providing new sources of access. See Peter M. Gerhart, Slow Transfonnations: 
The WTO As a Distributive Organization, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1045 (2002). For an 
update on the TRIPS-minus negotiations see Bryan C. Mercurio, TRIPS, Patents, and Access 
to Life-Saving Drugs in the Developing World, 8 MARQ.lNrELL. PROP. L. REv. 211 (2004). 
7 As our conference papers make clear, the United States has been using bi-lateral and 
regional trade agreements to enhance the protection of intellectual property through free 
trade agreements with individual or regional trading partners. This agenda is now known as 
the TRIPS-plus agenda. See e.g., Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: 
Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE 
W. REs. J. lNT'L L. 53 (2005) and Carlos M. Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: 
Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. REs. J.lNT'L L. 79 (2005). 
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is the central concern of domestic intellectual property-and heretofore the 
concern of states acting in relative isolation. Now that markets, including 
markets for knowledge goods, are transnational and global, that traditional 
question is transposed to the family of states. Here, the principle of 
territorialitl-that is, the principle that intellectual property law is 
primarily the creation of states and is confined to the borders of states-
induces intellectual property scholars ro ask the following central question: 
is the sum of the intellectual property systems of heterogeneous states, as 
influenced through international intermediation and institutions, enhancing 
global welfare or not? The focus is inevitably normative, with some metric 
of social welfare serving as the focal point for analysis.9 
International relations scholars, by contrast, focus first on process. 
They ask why, how, and to what effect nations interact, both directly with 
each other, and also through, and with, international institutions. 10 They 
model states as actors, looking inside states to understand how the interests 
and values of the state are formed, and looking outside states to understand 
how the interests and values of one state interact with, and are influenced 
by, the interests and values of other states and people in other states. 11 
Of course, substance and process are never far apart. As our 
conference participants made clear, intellectual property scholars resort to 
procedural analysis to support their normative orientation, just as 
international relations scholars resort to substantive analysis as they 
appraise international processes. That is what makes this marriage between 
the two perspectives such a natural one-the two perspectives cannot be 
separated and each reinforces the other. Although the primary interest of 
intellectual property scholars is on systems for maximizing the allocation of 
resources for the production of knowledge, when they work in the 
international sphere, international intellectual property scholars have been 
drawn into thinking about how national systems interrelate and how 
international institutions affect national systems. Similarly, although the 
international relations scholars seek to understand the inter-state and intra-
state forces that shape internationalization, those process concerns are 
8 See, e.g., GRAEME B. DINWOODIE, WILLIAM 0. HENNESSEY, AND SHIRA PERLMUTTER, 
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY 28-34 (2001). 
9 See, e.g., Elhanan He1pman, Innovation, Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61 
ECONOMETRICA 1247 (1993) (evaluating welfare effects of international intellectual property 
along several dimensions). 
10 For international relations perspectives on international intellectual property see SusAN 
K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS (2003) and MICHAEL RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND 
THE PoLmcs OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1958). 
11 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Dun~an Snidal, Values and Interests: International 
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. L. STUD. S141 (2002). 
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generally grounded on some assumptions, or assertions, about the welfare 
impact of various types of interactions. 
What is interesting, however, is to trace the ways in which substance 
and process interrelate in this setting, and the ways in which scholars from 
the different settings trace those relationships. What difference does it 
make if one uses process as the handmaiden of nonnative analysis-
analyzing the normative validity of international law by analyzing the 
process by which it was made-or if one uses normative analysis as the 
handmaiden of process-analyzing the process by which law is made by 
appraising its normative impact? · 
When we follow this substance/process dichotomy as it was revealed 
in the work of the scholars who graced our conference, we can begin to 
discern that each analytical perspective advances its claims in the midst of 
significant ambiguity-that is, each analytical perspective is built around 
assertions or assumptions that are themselves contestable, and that therefore 
threaten to upset or undermine the analysis that is based on that perspective. 
As we examine these ambiguities, we can see how the ambiguity of one 
perspective can be addressed from the perspective offered by the other 
field; the resources of one perspective become the means of addressing the 
ambiguities of a different perspective. Without multiple perspectives we 
are left with ambiguity, but when we bring multiple perspectives to bear we 
can begin to address the ambiguities. We cannot, in other words, bring our 
topic into full focus without bringing multiple perspectives to bear on the 
topic. 
II. The Ambiguities of Cooperation, Power, andNormative Welfare 
Let me illustrate this point by concentrating on three analytical 
perspectives that drove our conference: the nature of international 
cooperation, the role of power in the international system, and the 
normative assessment of the appropriate international regime for knowledge 
goods. I first examine each analytical perspective and the ambiguity that 
arises from that perspective; I then examine how one analytical perspective 
might be used to address the ambiguities of a different perspective. My 
conclusion is that given the ambiguity of cooperation, the ambiguity of 
power, and the ambiguity of normative analysis, no one analytical 
perspective can give us a full picture of the way the world works and of the 
impact of the way the world works on the welfare of the world. 
Triangulation is called for, with the perspectives being combined in a way 
that bring each ambiguity into focus, thereby reducing it to the extent 
possible. Let me expand on this point by examining the nature of the 
ambiguities and how they can be resolved. 
6 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol.36:1 
A. The Ambiguity of Cooperation 
International relations scholars work around a large black hole. We 
know that states cooperate-that is, that they do things jointly and interact 
in ways that change each other's behavior by changing each other's values 
and interests. We have rich theories that explain why and how states 
cooperate, 12 how international institutions evolve, 13 how international 
institutions, regimes and law affect state behavior, 14 and how transnational 
networks-both within15 and outside16 government-affect state behavior. 
Yet, we have no good metric for determining whether the gains of that 
cooperation are divided equally, or whether, indeed, there are reciprocal 
gains at all. Admittedly, we can begin any analysis of cooperation with the 
presumption that when states cooperate it is because cooperation improves 
the joint welfare of the negotiating states in some way. Why else would 
12 See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes 
as Inten,ening Variables, in lNTERNATIONAL REGIMES I (Stephen D. Krasner ed., Cornell 
University Press 1983) (articulating regime theory as a theory of cooperation); Jack L. 
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A 
Rationale Choice Perspective, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. Sll5 (2002) (articulating a rational choice 
framework for understanding international cooperation); ROBERT 0. KEoHANE, AFTER 
HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY, 85-109 (1984) 
(articulating "neoliberal" theory based on need to overcome bargaining failures); ABRAM 
CHA YES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHA YES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 27 (1995) (articulating theory that states gain 
power, and therefore sovereignty, by cooperation); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward 
an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1749 (2003) (seeing the state as 
embedded in a social community of states, which binds states in order to reflect shared 
values and to empower states); and Oona Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1821 (2003) (exploring the dynamics of commitment when a country does not receive a 
reciprocal benefit from other countries). 
13 See generally, Special Issue, The Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT. 
ORO. 761 (2001). 
14 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 
(1995) (seeing international cooperation leading to a convergence around norms of fairness); 
Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2602 
(1997) (emphasizing the way the interaction between states leads to norms that become 
internalized into national legal systems), and RICHARD F ALK, LAw IN AN EMERGING GLOBAL 
VILLAGE: A POST-WESTPHALIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998) (arguing that increased 
cosmopolitanism will restructure state interests and therefore the stability of cooperation). 
15 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing the transnational 
networks of government officials that influence state behavior and therefore form a new type 
of international governance). 
16 See, e.g., GLOBALIZATIONS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: CULTURE, POWER, AND THE 
TRANSNATIONAL PUBLIC SPHERE (John A. Guidry et a!. eds., 2000); MARGARET E. KECK & 
KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS, ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS (1998). 
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they cooperate? But cooperate is a tricky term. A person who surrenders 
his wallet at gun point is cooperating (in one sense), but we would hardly 
view that situation to be one ofjoint gains (except in the limited sense that 
the person surrendering his wallet is better off doing so than being harmed). 
In other words, theories of cooperation often assume that the fact that 
states cooperate must mean that the cooperation makes both parties better 
off, and, as an extension, they often assume that both parties are better off 
by the same amount of welfare. However, we cannot assume the welfare 
effects of cooperation. There is no a priori way of measuring the welfare 
effects of cooperation from the fact that states have signed a treaty or set up 
an international institution or otherwise changed their behavior in response 
to stimuli provided by other states. 17 There are enough instances of 
redistributive cooperation--cooperation that, because it results from power, 
yields either asymmetric or no joint gains18-to make us wary of simply 
assuming that cooperation enhances welfare. The fact that states 
"cooperate" does not necessarily translate into joint gains, and it certainly 
does not necessarily mean that gains are jointly divided in a way that would 
meet a common standard of fairness. 
What international relations theorists therefore desperately need is a 
metric for distinguishing "good" cooperation from "bad" cooperation, both 
to distinguish instances of joint welfare gains from instances of coercion, 
and also to determine whether welfare gains are equally divided, and 
whether it matters. Without such a metric, the cooperation that appears to 
be welfare enhancing, and therefore stable, may in fact be welfare 
decreasing and unstable. 19 
17 Analysts make this point implicitly when they suggest that we cannot understand, or 
evaluate, international regimes without understanding the power that led to those regimes. 
See, e.g., Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based 
Bargaining and Outcomes in the GATTIWTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002), and Richard H. 
Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A Transatlantic Strategy 
for Liberal Mutilateralism, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 205 (1998). One of our conference 
participants has done an especially effective job of exploring the imbalance in various forms 
of power that are embedded in the WTO system. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, Recognizing 
Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement : Who Participates? Who Decides?, 7 J.INT'L 
ECON. L. 459 (2004) (showing how power is reflected in the way countries use the dispute 
resolution process); Gregory C. Shaffer, The Nexus of Law and Politics: The WTO's 
Committee on Trade and Environment, in THE GREENING OF TRADE LAW, INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE ORGANIZATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2002). See 
also, Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World 
Trade Organization, 8 INT'L NEGOTIATION 79 (2003). 
18 See, e.g., Thomas Oatley and Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market 
Failure, Wealth Transfers, and the Basle Accord, 52.lNT'L ORG. 35 (1998). 
19 We can, in other words, evaluate any form of cooperation either on the ground that the 
cooperation improves, or fails to improve, some normative measure of welfare, or on the 
ground that the cooperation is destabilizing rather than stabilizing. Often cooperation that 
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There are, of course, two ways of filling the black hole left by the 
unsupported assumption that joint activity yields joint and symmetrical 
gains. One way is to study directly the power relationships that lead to 
cooperation and to analyze cooperation in terms of the power that shaped 
the cooperation. Because the division of gains from cooperation will 
reflect the relative power of the bargainers, if a metric existed for 
understanding the relative power of states we would have a basis for 
making a judgment about how the gains from cooperation are divided. For 
example, if the bargaining power of the states in a negotiation is evenly 
distributed, we might justifiably assume that each party will insist on a 
roughly equal division of the benefits of cooperation. If, by contrast, we 
have a David negotiating with a Goliath, we can assume that the gains will 
be distributed in accordance with their relative strengths. Yet, as I will 
make clear in a minute, power is itself an ambiguous concept, not only 
because it is difficult to measure, but also because it can be used for both 
good and evil. 
If we cannot resolve the ambiguity of cooperation by examining the 
nature of the power relationships that led to the cooperation, perhaps we 
could resort to the second method of helping to address the ambiguity-that 
is, we might develop a metric for measuring the nonnative welfare outcome 
of any cooperation. If we had such a metric, we could distinguish and 
evaluate various states of cooperation; some cooperation would be found to 
"unfairly" divide the gains of cooperation (as defined by our normative 
metric) and others would not. Yet, developing such a normative metric is 
also fraught with ambiguity, as we shall see shortly, and that ambiguity 
identifies another analytical gap that must be filled. We therefore need to 
understand both the ambiguity of power and the ambiguity of normative 
analysis in order to understand how we might evaluate cooperative 
solutions in a more comprehensive way, and to see how we might use our 
lenses of cooperation, power, and nonnative analysis to triangulate 
international intellectual property. 
B. The Ambiguity of Power 
As I have said, if we had a good metric for measuring the impact of 
power on cooperation, we might address the ambiguity of cooperation by 
trying to determine the ways in which the exercise of power has influenced 
the cooperation. If cooperation resulted from evenly distributed bargaining 
power we could assume that the benefits of cooperation were roughly 
evenly divided; if cooperation were achieved at the point of a gun, we could 
normatively reduces welfare will be destabilizing for that reason. But even cooperative 
systems that improve the welfare of all parties may prove to be unstable if the distribution of 
gains makes a member of the system so resentful that the member defects from the regime 
(either explicitly of implicitly). 
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assume that the benefits were not evenly divided. Aside from the 
difficulty20-some would say impossibility--Df developing such a metric,21 
even when power is used there is an ambiguity inherent in the use of 
power-an ambiguity that ran throughout our conference. The ambiguity 
of power is that power can be exercised for good as well as for evil. The 
fact that power is exercised appears to be troubling by itself-especially for 
those who do not have it-but if it is wielded for good rather than for ill, it 
is objectionable only if process trumps substance. . Both governance in 
general and the rule of law in particular represent exercises of power, and 
are not subject to criticism for that reason alone. A system with an 
altruistic Hegemon might be preferable to a system with widely dispersed, 
but diabolical, power. Power is not, by itself, the problem. 
In order to incorporate effectively a consideration of power into the 
analytics of cooperation we must overcome three obstacles. The first 
obstacle, already alluded to, is to define an analytics of power that allows us 
to determine whether power has been used and what its effects are. Power 
is easy to assert, but hard to measure. We know that states search for power 
during negotiations, either by building coalitions or breaking coalitions, 
either by enhancing their information or belittling other's information, and 
by both bluff and threat. But at the end of the day we have no basis for 
measuring the impact of power on the negotiations. Even a David can best 
a Goliath by exploiting a weakness. 
Moreover, even. if we had appropriate analytical tools for the task of 
tracing the effect of power on outcomes, we would also have to determine 
when the use of power is for good, rather than for ill. As -Ruth Okediji 
reminded us at the conference, under the current international system, we 
entrust the welfare of people to states. If states are dysfunctional, then 
intervention that overcomes that dysfunction may make people better off 
rather than worse. Again, there are enough instances of power being used 
20 The difficulty of distinguishing between cooperation that results from power and 
cooperation that does not is widely embedded in the literature about globalization. See, e.g., 
ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ALBERT BRESSAND & TAKATOSHI ITO, A VISION FOR THE WORLD 
ECONOMY: OPENNESS, DIVERSITY AND COHESION, 28-43 (1996) (distinguishing "imperial 
harmonization" from "competitive convergence"). 
21 We understand, of course, that power in a cooperative setting depends on the options 
that a state has if it decides not to cooperate; the more options a state has to achieve its goals 
in a non-cooperative way, the more credible are its threats to avoid, or defect from, 
cooperation. Accordingly, alternatives are the source of bargaining power because they 
frame the importance of cooperation to the state. Yet, it is never clear what weight particular 
options have as a source of leverage in negotiations. Even a state with many options will 
have a particularized need that it cannot meet in any other way. Moreover, if a state 
misunderstands its options, it may choose non-cooperative solutions that make it worse off. 
Bargaining partners that understand this will not be influenced by the options a state thinks 
that it has. 
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for good that we should be wary of any analysis that does not differentiate 
the use of power from the misuse of power. 
Yet, even if we can discern the "good" use of power from the "bad" 
use of power, we face a third difficulty in developing an analytics of 
power-namely, that even if power is exercised to do substantive good 
unambiguously, there may still be instances where the damage done to 
process values by the use of power outweighs the normative good that the 
power does. Sometimes process values trump normative values because 
achieving legitimate ends by illegitimate means may so destabilize a social 
system as to lead, ultimately, to less welfare rather than more. The use of 
power implicates both normative and process values, and we cannot praise 
power for its nonnative results without also examining the impact of the use 
of power on process values. This requires that we have a way of 
understanding how process values enter into the utility functions of the 
states. 
Accordingly, the ambiguity of power presents significant difficulties 
for any approach that seeks to overcome the ambiguity of cooperation by 
resorting to a direct assessment of the impact of power on the nature of 
cooperation. We might turn to normative analysis to fill the gap, but here 
too we find substantial ambiguities that complicate the analysis. 
C. The Ambiguity of Normative Analysis 
In an ideal world, we could use normative analysis to help us resolve 
the ambiguities of cooperation and power. Normative intellectual property 
analysis would be able to tell us whether a system of norm creation is used 
for good or for ill based on an analysis that measures the values that are 
important to a particular vision of human welfare-for example on the 
incentives for creating, and gaining access to, new knowledge. Of course, 
we would have to specify and defend a conception of human welfare, and 
that issue is deeply contestable,22 but in principle if we could specify a 
22 I have already referred to the difference between a rights based, deontological approach 
to intellectual property and an instrumentalist, consequentialist approach, see supra, note 4. 
The deontological approaches to intellectual property are derived from Lockean property 
theory, as applied in various theories of individual rights. It is very much associated with the 
philosophy of Robert Nozick See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 178-182 
(1974). Among the most noteworthy deontological approaches to general welfare analysis is 
that of John Rawls, where the distributional aspects of human welfare predominate. JoHN 
RAWLs, A THEORY OF JusTICE 245-248 (1999). Among consequentialist theories, the 
maximization of wealth often serves as a measure of human welfare, but wider conceptions 
of human welfare, including distributional consequences, are possible through a 
consequentialist approach. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 
21-23 (2002), (suggesting that social welfare can take into account one person's interest in 
the welfare of others, and thus incorporate fairness values as one of the consequences that 
matters). See also, AMAR.TYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (2000) (suggesting that 
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metric for measuring human welfare we would be able to trace the impact 
of any legal regime on that metric, and that would help us to assess and 
evaluate the nature of both cooperation and power. For example, if we 
specified that the welfare effects of any international regime must be evenly 
shared among all countries, we could look at the welfare effects of any 
regime and then evaluate the nature of the cooperation and the power that 
underlies that regime. A regime that yields joint gains, evenly distributed, 
would allow us to infer that the cooperation was joint-benefit maximizing 
and that it was not influenced by power. By contrast, a regime that yielded 
asymmetrical gains or even one-sided gains would be seen to have the 
indicia of redistributive cooperation. Working backwards we could then 
identify which aspects of cooperation and which aspects of the use of power 
seem to be causal indicators of the outcome that either conforms to, or 
detracts from, our specified notion of welfare. 
Not surprisingly, we do not live in this ideal world of normative 
acuity. Several of the problems are well known-the two most prominent 
ones being the difficulty of defining and then measuring welfare. We were 
reminded at several points in the conference of the substantial debate over 
the precise welfare effects that attend any change in intellectual property 
laws. In addition, we agreed that debates about the definition and 
measurement of the welfare effects of intellectual property are rife, even in 
domestic intellectual property systems. These ambiguities are augmented 
when we are dealing with an international, rather than a national, system. 
The general problems involved in defming the welfare effects of national 
intellectual property policy are exacerbated in the international field by the 
distortions that the international system brings to intellectual property 
lawmaking. Whatever the precise shape for intellectual property that is best 
for a state when it thinks of its welfare in isolation, when that state 
considers its position on international intellectual property law, the state's 
welfare calculus changes. The fact is that when intellectual property is 
projected into the international field, the search for balance between 
incentives and access yields to either the search for wealth (for intellectual 
property exporters) or the search for access (for intellectual property 
importers), and any national interest in a balanced regime internally gives 
way to an interest in an external regime that is imbalanced--one that will 
therefore be imbalanced to meet the interests of the states with the most 
bargaining power.23 
In other words, international intellectual property regimes are not 
made through a search for the right balance between incentives and access 
because the states that make the regime are not, individually, looking for 
maximizing individual potential could fruitfully bridge the gap between consequentialist and 
deontological approaches). 
23 See Peter M. Gerhart, Why Lawmaldng for Global Intellectual Property is Unbalanced, 
22 E.I.P.R. 309 (2000). 
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that balance in the international sphere. Each state is looking for an 
international regime that reflects that state's interests. Whether that results 
in an international system that is "balanced" in some sense of global 
welfare is not a reflection on what the parties are searching for individually, 
but simply of the happenstance that the negotiating power of the states is 
distributed in a way that happens, almost by coincidence, to reach that 
result. 
In any event, there is simply no metric for determining whether the 
global welfare delivered by an international system is optimal. It is difficult 
enough to aggregate the different preferences within a state to determine 
what is in a state's interest, and even more difficult to determine how 
appropriately to compare the welfare of one state with that of another state. 
Lacking such a metric, even intellectual property scholars are forced to 
resort to an analysis of the process by which international intellectual 
property is made in order to make some judgments about the substantive 
wisdom of the laws that are evolving. The ambiguities of normative 
analysis require us to resort to process analysis, and therefore to resort 
either to the analytics of cooperation or the analytics of power. 
In other words, our conference traced three broad focal points for 
understanding the future of international intellectual property: theories of 
cooperation, theories of power, and theories of notmative welfare. Any one 
of these themes tells us something about the future of intellectual property, 
but each theme needs to be supplemented by at least one of the other 
themes in order to provide a meaningful contribution to our understanding 
of the forces that shape the international regimes. Analysts who start from 
the lens of cooperation can say that because the international system 
reflects a cooperative outcome, it must increase global welfare, but they 
cannot say that with confidence unless they can also rule out the possibility 
(based on the lens of power) that the cooperation was really coerced, or 
redistributive, or (alternatively) unless they can provide a metric of the 
nonnative welfare effects of the cooperation that is widely accepted. 
Analysts who start from the lens of power can portray the international 
intellectual property regime as problematic because it is derived from an 
imbalance of negotiating power, but they cannot say anything meaningful 
about the international system unless they can also argue (from the 
normative perspective) that the use of power has reduced (rather than 
improved) global welfare, or subverted systemic values in a meaningful 
way. Finally, analysts who focus first on the normative welfare impacts of 
intellectual property regimes are unable to say anything meaningful about 
the international system unless they have a way of comparing, on the one 
hand, the welfare of countries that gain from international intellectual 
property with, on the other hand, the welfare of countries that lose from 
international intellectual property. That can best be done by examining 
whether the development of international law reflects cooperative power or 
coercive power. 
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Not surprisingly, then, scholars approaching international intellectual 
property must triangulate using a mix of cooperation theory, power theory, 
and normative theory; each with its own limitations, but each bringing 
something valuable to help address the ambiguities in other approaches. 
Ill Realism, Liberalism, and Distributive Values 
Before summarizing how the individual papers in this symposium 
relate to this triangulation, we can also profit by looking more intensely at 
pairs of this triumvirate. Our conference also suggested interesting insights 
that come about if we look more intensely at the combination of just two of 
the three focal points, one with a lesson for international relations scholars 
and the other with a lesson for intellectual property scholars. In particular, 
the conference suggested that by putting the focal point of cooperation 
together with the focal point of power we can see the need to merge, within 
the umbrella, of international relations theory, the perspectives of liberalism 
with the perspective of realism. And when we put together the focal point 
of power with the focal point of normative welfare, we can see the need to 
include distributive concerns explicitly in our analysis of the normative 
impact of international intellectual property law. Let me briefly summarize 
these points. 
A. The Merger of Liberalism and Realism: The Theory of 
Distributive Cooperation 
Traditionally, international relations theorists have seen themselves as 
following either liberal or realist approaches to international affairs; a 
division that roughly mirrors the contrast between the theories of 
cooperation and theories of power that I outlined above. International 
relations scholars in the liberal tradition have worked out the theory and 
implications of international cooperation, without having to worry about the 
normative impact of the cooperation, while realists think of the 
international system in terms of power, without paying much attention to 
how the cooperation that results from the power changes the power 
relationships. In this stylized view, liberalists concentrate on the analytics 
of cooperation, working out how and why states cooperate, form 
international institutions, and subject themselves to the constraints and 
opportunities of the international regime. They essentially work out the 
logic of collective action among states. Their hope is that international 
cooperation, by channeling rivalry into accepted boundaries with effective 
dispute resolution, will result in a stable system where war is unlikely. 
Realists, on the other hand, work out the analytics of power. Their 
focus-and the endgame of the realist logic-is that what matters to a state 
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is relative power-that is, a state's power relative to other states?4 For 
realists, cooperation is but an expression of power and is inherently 
unstable because when cooperation threatens the power relationships that 
are important to states, the cooperation will end. 
It is common to assume that realists and liberalists could not coexist, 
and analysts in the two traditions are largely viewed to present competing 
theories of international relations. To a realist, international cooperation 
does not matter because it is always subservient to state interest, which 
always seeks to enhance a state's relative power. In the liberal tradition, 
cooperation matters because cooperation yields joint gains, and the search 
for joint gains can overcome a state's interest in relative power by changing 
the state's perception of its security interests. 
But when we put the perspective of cooperation together with the 
perspective of power that arose from our conference, we can suggest that 
the logic of realism was never antagonistic to cooperation. Realism did not 
deny the ability of states to make treaties, to ease frictions, and to change 
their behavior in response to the behavioral changes in other states. To 
realists, cooperation is always possible and always in a state's interests-
with one important proviso: the cooperation has to preserve, or increase, the 
relative power of the dominant players in order to give them the sense of 
security they need. In the realist view, a dominant state would always 
cooperate to improve the welfare of another state, provided only that it 
would gain by that cooperation more than the other state did-that is, as 
long as the cooperation secured, or enhanced, its relative power. 
Naturally, when gains are evenly divided between a powerful and a 
powerless state, the powerless state gains relatively more than the powerful 
state. That will not, however, keep the logic of realism from allowing the 
powerful state to cooperate. In any dynamic system, the power of the 
Hegemon is constantly eroding (unless it is maintained by force). 
Accordingly, the powerful state will lose relative power if it does not 
cooperate; convergence is natural in a world where small states need to 
increase their power in order to protect their security. Accordingly, even a 
powerful state is faced with the possibility of losing its power if it does not 
cooperate with others. It will therefore cooperate in a way that slows down 
the natural erosion of its power, looking at that gain as an additional gain of 
cooperation. 
Under this scenario, a powerful state will gain from cooperation in two 
ways: from the direct benefits of the cooperation and from slowing down 
the process through which it loses power. These gains may well make the 
relative gains from cooperation greater for the powerful country, even if the 
direct gains of cooperation are evenly divided. 
24 See, e.g., KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979); JOHN J. 
MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS 29-30 (2001); John J. 
Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT'L SEC. 5 (1995). 
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International intellectual property is important for international 
relations theory precisely because it demonstrates that cooperation can 
follow realist logic. For example, the United States faces significant 
economic competition and depletion of relative power from Europe, Japan, 
and emerging markets, yet, by directing cooperation toward knowledge 
goods-particularly those in which the United States has a competitive 
advantage-it can project its economic dominance longer than if there were 
no cooperation in knowledge goods. One can easily support the hypothesis 
that cooperation over international intellectual property results from the 
search for benefits that increase the power of the powerful states relative to 
states without power. Under this hypothesis, the United States is following 
realist logic when it advances the TRIPS agenda or the TRIPS plus agenda, 
for it is working to secure its relative benefits from intellectual property, 
and therefore securing its relative power and security in an area of great 
strategic importance (knowledge goods) and great wealth producing 
importance (revenues from knowledge goods). International intellectual 
property allows us to see that the logic of cooperation does not necessarily 
deny the logic of realism. 
Liberalism and realism can therefore be seen as complimentary, rather 
than competing, theories; liberal theory notes the benefits of cooperation, 
while realist theory shows the limits of cooperation in overcoming the need 
to project and use power in the state interest. 25 In the liberal tradition-the 
happy face of globalization-the cooperation produces joint gains that 
make all states better off. In the realist tradition, the cooperation makes the 
dominant players better off faster than the less dominant players, or reduces 
the erosion of their dominance, and therefore serves the interests of the 
dominant players primarily. The dominant players, of course, write the 
ideology of post Cold War cooperation. Naturally, they emphasize the joint 
and reciprocal gains from cooperation. But the possible complimentarity of 
realism and liberalism requires that we work out the analytics of power-
that is, a metric for determining when the gains from cooperation are jointly 
shared (the pathology of cooperation) and when they are skewed in favor of 
one party over another (the pathology of power). We must have models 
that help us differentiate skewed gains from joint gains. 
B. Distributive Aspects of Normative Welfare 
Just as we gain insight by looking at the relationship between 
cooperation and power, so too do we gain insight when we look at the 
relationship between power and normative welfare. What becomes clear 
when we contemplate international intellectual property is the need to make 
25 A similar point is made in Jonathan D. Greenberg, Does Power Trump Law?, 55 STAN. 
L. REv. 1789, 1818 (2003) (noting the value of realist perspectives in reminding us that 
stable cooperative systems are nonetheless fragile). 
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sure that the design of international intellectual property regimes takes into 
account not only the efficiency gains from intellectual property regimes but 
also how those efficiency gains are distributed. The need to consider 
deliberately the distributional values that are implicated by the system 
becomes an important part of institutional design. 
As I have commented elsewhere, when we think of the welfare aspects 
of intellectual property we normally do not think of the distributive 
dimension-that is, we do not think about how the gains and losses from 
policy design are distributed. 26 This is because we normally think of 
normative welfare within a country, where we can rely on the tax and spend 
power of government to address the distributive values that cannot be 
reached through the intellectual property system. If some people are too 
poor to have access to essential patented medicines, for example, the 
government can subsidize their purchase in order to provide access that the 
intellectual property system would otherwise deny. Moreover, some 
distributional values are embedded (almost invisibly) in those parts of 
intellectual property doctrine that provide access to those who would 
otherwise be hard pressed to pay for the property.27 
In the international system, however, the institutional infrastructure 
for making such distributive decisions is missing; we have no institutional 
structure for making the welfare decisions that determine, across states, 
whether and how those who gain from a particular policy should 
compensate those who lose from the policy. Accordingly, in the 
international system, distributive values must be embedded in the 
international intellectual property system itself, through the provisions of 
intellectual property systems that provide for fair use or other access 
rights-otherwise these values will be ignored. Simply put, in the 
international arena, there is no good mechanism for taking into account the 
inability of poor countries to pay for the knowledge goods that they need in 
order to enhance their own welfare, and if distributional goals are to have 
any salience, the goals must be forthrightly addressed. 
Indeed, as I made clear above, the configuration of the international 
lawmaking system is biased against distributive values. The United States 
negotiates out of its interest as it defines that interest, and there is no a 
priori reason why the United States should contemplate the impact of 
international policy on the poor in other countries when it decides what its 
interests are and how it should use its influence to shape international 
26 Peter M. Gerhart, Distributional Values and Institutional Design in the Provision of 
Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
supra note 3. 
27 For example, we can see distributional values at work in the first sale doctrine, which 
allows one who owns a copyrighted product to loan it to others-thereby making libraries 
possible. Libraries, in tum, serve as important sources of access for those who would 
otherwise not be able to pay for the copyrighted material. 
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policy. After all, the poor are not in the United States, so they do not make 
up a part of the polity that defines, through democratic representation, the 
United States' interest. The United States incorporates the interests of the 
poor abroad only when the interests of the poor become the interests of the 
United States, either because people within the United States represent the 
interests of these poor individuals or because helping the poor is in the 
interest of the United States. And, because bargaining power at the WTO is 
determined by the relative economic strength of each country, the poorest 
countries do not have the power to bargain to insure that access to 
knowledge goods is given sufficient priority. 
The lesson for intellectual property scholars is clear. In the 
international arena, the distributive values that are likely to be affected by 
the design of the international intellectual property system must be 
explicitly identified and considered in the design of the system; they cannot 
be left to other institutional mechanisms. 
IV This Symposium Issue 
Thus far, I have referred to the general themes that came out of our 
conference, presenting my interpretation, after reflection, of the many 
splendid contributions that went into the conference. Let me now move 
from the general to the particular, looking at the individual contributions to 
the conference that generated these reflections. In what way did the 
individual excellence of each of our participants contribute to and reinforce 
this particular understanding of the intersection between international 
relations theory and international intellectual property? 
George Downs and Eyal Benvenisti, in their article Distributive 
Politics and International Institutions: The Case of Drugs, adopt the 
perspective of power, and point out that both international law and 
behavioral norms that are embedded in regimes are the product of inter-
state politics and are therefore the. projection of power. Accordingly, we 
cannot fully understand either international law or international regimes if 
we do not -see them as an exercise of power by states. Their analysis 
supports the notion that cooperation through either law or through regimes 
can be fully understood only by finding a way of assessing the power that 
underlies, and therefore continues to influence, the regime. Because they 
are conscious that power is neither one-dimensional nor directly 
measurable, professors Downs and Benvenisti seek a proxy measure that 
will help us understand the power that exists in the international system, 
and they come up with an ingenious proxy. By focusing on a country's 
ability to negotiate for lower prices on individual drugs when they buy 
directly from drug companies, they are able to observe a market price that 
reflects power-that is, a measure of the normative effects of having (or not 
having) power. 
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Peter Drahos, in his article Securing the Future of Intellectual 
Property: Intellectual Property Owners and their Nodally Coordinated 
Eriforcement Pyramid, also approaches his subject from the perspective of 
power, but his concern is to show how a state with a strong interest in the 
foreign enforcement of intellectual property law is likely to organize itself, 
internally and with respect to the foreign country, to ma~imize the 
projection of its power. He thus explains why a powerful country has an 
interest in how other countries enforce intellectual property rights, how 
such a country sifts through and evaluates the variety of its domestic 
interests and overseas opportunities, and how a country focuses that interest 
in its relationships with other countries. His assumption is that countries 
that are strong intellectual property producers have the interest and 
incentive to seek stronger overseas enforcement of their rights. Such a 
country, however, needs a process for choosing which domestic interests to 
champion, and Professor Drahos uses a model of nodal governance to 
understand that process. Such a country also needs a process of negotiating 
with foreign countries to encourage their intellectual property vigilance, and 
Professor Drahos uses the model of enforcement pyramids to show how a 
country projects its power. Finally, such a country needs a process for 
anticipating and responding to attempts by the foreign country to change 
the relative balance of power, and Professor Drahos uses the theory of 
forum shifting to show how a country can change the mix of carrots and 
sticks that it uses by negotiating in various forums and across subject matter 
to keep coalitions from forming. 
Professor Carlos Correa, in his article Bilateralism in Intellectual 
Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, follows up 
on this general line of analysis with a more particularized examination of 
forum shifting, looking at how the United States has used negotiations in 
the context of the Central American Free Trade Agreement to realign the 
normative commitments of the Central American countries to intellectual 
property, resulting in a new TRIPS-plus regime. He reviews in great detail 
the provisions in CAFTA that result in a TRIPS-plus regime, but then 
notices a curious fact-that in some respects the negotiation may also lead 
to enhanced intellectual property protection in the United States, suggesting 
that intellectual property owners in the United States are successfully able 
to use international negotiations to increase their power within the United 
States. This leads to the possibility of a continuing upward ratcheting of 
global intellectual property rights; as the value to United States rights 
holders increases, the incentive on the United States to seek to profit from 
that value abroad also increases, inducing the United States to seek even 
higher standards in the future. 
Building on the insight that national intellectual property systems will 
increasingly be shaped by international developments, professors 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss continue their groundbreaking exploration of 
whether life under the TRIPS regime may preclude a country from 
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fashioning the balance between incentive and access that achieves their 
normative goals and reflects their unique conditions.28 In their article 
TRIPS and the Dynamics of Intellectual Property Lawmaking, they explore 
an important aspect of the neo-federalism that is emerging under TRIPS-
whether and to what extent international intellectual property law under 
TRIPS will inhibit a country from adjusting domestic intellectual property 
rights along different dimensions, creating greater protections along some 
dimensions while reducing protection along others. Their theme-that 
WTO dispute resolution must recognize the political realities within states, 
and not view legislation as a compilation of discrete mandates subject to 
individual review-suggests that normative welfare issues at the state level 
cannot all be solved through an international template, and that those 
interpreting the global obligations should be sensitive to the local context in 
which balances are struck. 
Laurence Helfer, in his paper entitled Mediating Interactions in an 
Expanding Intemational Intellectual Property Regime, moves in a 
complimentary direction by showing how our understanding of regime 
theory can be deepened if we comprehend how states use regimes to 
increase their power or decrease the power of those with whom they 
negotiate. Of the many important points that he makes in this and an earlier 
paper on regime theory,29 two stand out in terms of the themes that I have 
drawn from our conference. The first is that states can move (or try to 
move) subject matter to new regimes as a way of changing the nature of the 
norms that are taken into account in thinking about the topic. Whereas 
TRIPS might be heavily weighted toward the incentive side of the balance 
(reflecting its origin in the industrial countries), by shifting subject matter to 
regimes that are more sensitive to distributional values (such as public 
health), countries may be able to restore some balance between incentive 
and access, and thus between efficiency values and distributional fairness. 
Moreover, his paper makes clear that the decision to treat intellectual 
property as a subject matter for international negotiations, separate and 
apart from all the subject matter for which it has consequences (such as 
health, local culture, and education) was a "framing decision" that itself 
reflects the interests and values of the countries that have the power to 
frame issues in international negotiations. He successfully shows that 
regime theory rebuts the realist notion that international norms do not 
matter. He does not deny, however, the realist assumption that the search 
for relative power is one of the driving forces behind regimes and regime 
change. 
28 There earlier work was Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
International Intellectual Property Law and the Public Domain of Science, 7 J. INT'L ECON. 
L. 431 (2004). 
29 Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of 
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1 (2004). 
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V Conclusion 
Our conference demonstrated why international intellectual property 
provides such a rich lens through which to view international relations. 
International intellectual property illustrates the stark contrast between the 
"have" states and the "have not" states. It provides a seemingly endless 
puzzle of causality-whether the "have not" states are poor because they 
have not had intellectual property systems or, on the other hand, whether 
they have not had intellectual property systems because they are poor. It 
focuses on important questions about the role of power in the international 
system and the resulting welfare effects when that power is used. 
International intellectual property gets each state deeply involved in the 
internal domestic policy of other states, and it does so in ways that apply 
uniquely to the forms of rights protected in intellectual property. Because 
international intellectual property harnesses the dispute resolution 
provisions of the WTO, it requires WTO members to honor the rule of law 
with respect to these rights, and makes intellectual property rights a 
legitimate focus of bilateral and regional negotiations, bringing 
international law into the core of state governance as it has never been 
before. 
We hope that the papers presented in this symposium issue 
successfully present the range of thought that is important to understanding 
this new form of international cooperation and rivalry. 
